







We raise various puzzles about the relationship between God (if God exists) and the meaning of                               
life (if life has meaning). These difficulties suggest that, even if we assume that God exists, and                                 
even if (as we argue) God’s existence would entail that our lives have meaning, God is not and                                   
could not be the ​source of the meaning of life. We conclude by discussing implications of our                                 
arguments: (i) these claims can be used in a novel argument for atheism; (ii) these claims                               





In the literature on the meaning of life over the last few decades, the “meaning of life” is                                   
generally taken to be some positive feature of an individual’s life that is distinct from (though                               
perhaps related to) other positive features (wellbeing, happiness, etc.) that a life might or might                             
not have. It is also typically thought that lives can have meaning to varying degrees, so e.g., one                                   
life might be more meaningful than another, or the same life might be more or less meaningful at                                   
different times.  We follow these conventions.    1
Some philosophers have endorsed the view that God is somehow the source of the                           
meaning of life and moreover, God’s existence is necessary for life to have meaning. For                             
example, some claim “that God has a ​plan for the universe and that one's life is meaningful to the                                     
degree that one helps God realize this plan” (Metz 2013: section 2.1). Some have argued that                               2
our lives would be meaningless without an objective moral code, and only God could provide                             
1  See Metz (2013) for a discussion of the meaning of life literature and these conventions                             
(which Metz endorses).   






such a code (see Craig (1994)); some claim that without God, our lives would be “contingent”                               
and therefore meaningless (see, e.g., Haber (1997)); while still others claim “that our lives would                             
have meaning only insofar as they were intentionally fashioned by a creator, thereby obtaining                           
meaning of the sort that an art­object has (Gordon (1983))” (Metz 2013: section 2.1). Of course,                               
objections have been raised to these views, and there are secular accounts of the meaning of life;                                 
nevertheless, the God­based approach has been and still is prominent in the philosophical                         
literature on the meaning of life.    3
This paper concerns the relationship between God and the meaning of life. We argue for                             
the following two conditional claims: (1) ​if God exists, then all lives have meaning. However,                             
(2) ​if any life has meaning, then God is not the source of this meaning (even if God exists); i.e.,                                       
God­based approaches to the meaning of life are problematic. God’s existence would guarantee                         4
that our lives have meaning, and so the existence of God is a ​sufficient condition for life having                                   
meaning, though God could not be the source of this meaning, so God is not a ​necessary                                 
condition for life having meaning.   
3 And God­based approaches to the meaning of life have been endorsed by many                         
non­philosophically oriented theists. The view has also been held by some philosophically                       
oriented non­theists. Kahane (2013: 2) claims that “Russell thought that, in the absence of God,                             
we must build our lives on ‘a foundation of unyielding despair.'” ​Albert Camus (1955) is                             
arguably another example.   
For secular accounts of the meaning of life, see, e.g., Nozick (1981), Wolf (1997), Bond                             
(1983), and Singer (1993: Chapter 12).   
4 To be precise, there are numerous possibilities: it might be that only some lives have                               
meaning. Or perhaps all lives have meaning, though what gives life meaning might vary across                             
individuals; i.e., why assume that there is only one meaning that life can have? Perhaps the                               
meaning of one life is not the same as the meaning of another life? Or maybe a given life has                                       
meaning at some times but not others? Or perhaps the meaning that a given life has might                                 
change over time? To be clear, when we say that God could not be the source of the meaning of                                       












This premise is true by definition; it is simply the definition of “God” endorsed by many                               
classical theists.   Furthermore, 5
(2) If God is all­good, all­knowing, and all­powerful, then no lives are meaningless.   
The God of classical theism, a perfect being, would not create beings that have a meaningless                               
existence. To clarify, recall that in the extant literature, it is generally agreed that lives can have                                 
different degrees of meaning; for example, one person’s life might be more meaningful than                           
another’s. So more precisely, (2) claims that if God is omniscient, omnipotent and                         
omnibenevolent, then no individual human life is completely devoid of meaning, even if a given                             
life might have less meaning than another life. ​First​, note that (2) is consistent with theism; the                                 
theist can simply hold that God exists, that (2) is true, and therefore, no lives are meaningless.                                 
Likewise, (2) is consistent with atheism; the atheist can claim that ​if ​God exists, life would have                                 
5   See, e.g., Wainwright (2012: Introduction), 
The object of attitudes valorized in the major religious traditions is                     
typically regarded as maximally great. Conceptions of maximal greatness differ                   
but theists believe that a maximally great reality must be a maximally                       
great ​person​ or God. Theists largely agree that a maximally great person would be                       






meaning, yet still deny that God exists, whether they think life has meaning or not. So, clearly                                 
this premise does not beg the question against either theism or atheism.   
Second​, the Anselmian God is (i) omniscient, and so would know whether or not human                             
life would have meaning in a given possible world, (ii) omnipotent, and so could presumably                             
actualize a possible world in which life has meaning, and (iii) omnibenevolent, and so should                             
want to actualize a world in which life has meaning because presumably, meaningful life is                             
preferable to meaningless life. So, ​if this being exists, it would actualize a world in which life                                 
has meaning. Therefore, if the God of classical theism exists, then our lives have meaning; i.e.,                               
premise (2) is true.   
Third​, ​note that it is widely agreed by theists and atheists alike that if ​gratuitous suffering                               
exists, God does not. Rowe (1979: 333), e.g., remarks that the incompatibility of God’s                           
existence and the existence of gratuitous evil “is . . . held in common by many atheists and                                   
nontheists. . . . [It] seems to express a belief that accords with our basic moral principles,                                 
principles shared by both the theists and nontheists.”  Likewise, Wykstra (1984, 141­142) states, 
“The heart of [Rowe's incompatibility claim] is ... a conceptual truth unpacking                       
part of what it means to call any being – not just any omniscient being – morally                                 
good. . . . [Denying it] is tantamount to saying that God could allow some intense                               
suffering either because he enjoys the sight of occasional suffering for its own                         
sake, or because he is indifferent to it. It is hard to see how such a being could be                                     
meaningfully praised as a good God, worthy of our worship, our obedience, and –                           
not least – our trust. I take this to be a basic conceptual truth deserving assent by                                 
theists and nontheists alike.​”    6
 
6 While a large majority of philosophers of religion – whether they are theist, atheist, or agnostic                                 
– agree that the existence of God is inconsistent with the existence of gratuitous evil, it should at                                   
least be noted that there are some dissenters. For example, Peterson (2008), Hasker (1992), and                             






But also note that if our lives lack meaning, then our suffering is gratuitous. If our lives are                                   
ultimately meaningless, then any suffering we endure would be meaningless too (for if our                           
suffering had meaning, then our lives would as well). If our lives lack meaning, there would be                                 
no greater meaning for our suffering either, and so it would be gratuitous. But then, given that                                 
we do suffer, and that God’s existence and gratuitous suffering are not compossible, if God                             
exists, our lives must have meaning.   
Fourth​, if our lives lack meaning, then creating us would be meaningless too; there                           
would literally be no reason for God to create us if our lives lack meaning. So, if God does                                     
indeed exist and created or actualized the actual world, then the fact that God chose to actualize a                                   
world that contains us suggests that our lives have meaning, even if we do not or even cannot                                   
know what it is.  That is, if God exists, then our lives have meaning.   
We briefly address some possible objections. ​First​, a theist might object that perhaps                         
God merely makes it ​possible ​for our lives to have meaning; perhaps, e.g., ​we have to make that                                   
possibility actual somehow. God created the conditions in which ​all lives ​could have meaning                           
and that is all a perfect being need do. If so, then it is possible for some lives to lack meaning                                         
even though God exists, and (2) is false. But again, if ​some lives lack meaning, then the                                 
suffering that ​those with meaningless lives endure is gratuitous, and gratuitous suffering is                         
inconsistent with the existence of God.   
Second​, again, the consensus in the extant literature is that the meaning of life is distinct                               
from (though perhaps related to) other positive features of an individual’s life, e.g., wellbeing or                             
happiness. But if so, perhaps an individual life could have certain positive features in such                             





person even if their life is meaningless. If so, then (2) is false; a life devoid of meaning is                                     
consistent with God’s existence, and so God’s existence is not sufficient for life to have                             
meaning. However, one might wonder if an individual even could be immensely happy – or                             
truly happy – if their life is meaningless. And one might wonder if God would actualize a                                 
meaningless life even if the life is a superficially happy one. And again, this life could contain                                 
no suffering at all, for any suffering that it would contain would be gratuitous, and gratuitous                               
suffering is inconsistent with God’s existence.   
Third​, one might object that perhaps it is logically impossible for all (or even some) lives                               
to have meaning. If so, then God could – without blame – create lives that lack meaning, since                                   
God cannot be faulted for not doing the logically impossible. But it is difficult to see why it                                   
would be logically impossible for a life to have meaning. And in any event, again, if someone                                 
has a meaningless life, then their suffering is gratuitous, and the existence of God is logically                               
inconsistent with gratuitous suffering. So, if indeed some of us in the actual world have                             
meaningless lives, God does not exist. (2) is a conditional, so to falsify it, the antecedent would                                 
need to be true while the consequent is false; but this objection entails that the antecedent is                                 
false, so this objection could not demonstrate the falsity of (2).   
Fourth​, ​perhaps God has some justifiable reason, one that we do not or maybe even could                               
not understand, for allowing at least some human lives to be meaningless. For example, one                             
might object that according to skeptical theism, the moral truths and entailment relations that we                             
know of are a small fraction of the moral truths and entailment relations that there are. However,                                 
God would know all of the moral truths and entailment relations that are logically possible to                               





God to allow some meaningless human life. From God’s perspective, (2) is false, and so it is in                                   
fact false, even though from our perspective (2) appears true. Skeptical theism is often                           
advocated as a response to William Rowe’s version of the evidential problem of evil (POE). In                               
Rowe’s version of the POE, one infers from the inscrutability of various evils (e.g. our inability                               
to explain them) the conclusion that those evils are probably gratuitous. Skeptical theism blocks                           7
that inference because, on skeptical theism, our inability to explain an apparent evil does not                             
imply that that evil probably cannot be explained. ​However, notice what follows for the meaning                            
of life given skeptical theism. From our perspective, it seems like it would be less perfect for                                 
God to create lives that lack meaning. But God knows vastly more moral truths and entailment                               
relations than we do. So from God’s perspective, it might serve some greater good – of which                                 
we are unaware – to create lives that lack meaning. Our response is that there is something                                 
incoherent about this objection. If God creates meaningless human lives in the effort to bring                             
about some greater good that could only be achieved through doing so, then our lives do indeed                                 
have meaning and purpose, namely, ​to play a role in bringing about this greater good​. Also, it is                                   
far from clear that skeptical theism is true, so it is far from clear that any objection based upon                                     
can succeed.    8
7 Rowe has defended this argument in a number of papers. See, for example, Rowe (1979;                             
1984; 1986; 1988; 1991; 1996). 
8 There are several extant objections to skeptical theism. Ordinarily, theists say we are                         
justified in trusting propositional information known only through divine revelation because God                       
would not lie to us; yet, because skeptical theism leaves open the possibility that God might have                                 
morally obligatory reasons to lie to us, we are rendered unable to say how likely or unlikely                                 
God's lying would be (Wielenberg (2010); Hudson (2014)). There are further skeptical                       
implications: Descartes ruled out the possibility that God would deceive us about the external                           
world and the reliability of our senses, yet skeptical theism suggests that God could have a moral                                 





Fifth​, we have never offered – or tried to offer – a positive account of what makes life                                   
meaningful. And one might worry that on some particular accounts of the meaning of life, it                               
might be that God could be justified in creating a life that lacks meaning. But we suggest that                                   
our arguments are sufficiently general: they can succeed no matter what specific account of the                             
meaning of life is true. Suppose that God exists and also suppose that any life that has feature ​F                                     
is meaningful. Whatever ​F ​might be, i.e., whatever particular account of the meaning of life is                               
true, having ​F ​is necessary and sufficient for life to have meaning. And now suppose that there                                 
can be a life without ​F​. But then the suffering in this life would be gratuitous and God cannot                                     
allow gratuitous suffering. So if God exists, then no matter what ​F is, i.e., no matter what                                 
particular account of the meaning of life is true, then all lives must have ​F​. No matter which                                   
theory of the meaning of life is true, if God exists, God is sufficient for life to have meaning.                                     
One might worry that perhaps God could use a meaningless life to bring about a greater good; if                                   
so, then the suffering in this life is not gratuitous, and so God is perhaps justified in creating that                                     
life, yet this person’s life is still meaningless. But it seems that if we are in a universe created by                                       




Of course, (1) and (2) entail (3) with hypothetical syllogism. The existence of God would                             
guarantee that our lives have meaning, whatever that meaning might be. God’s existence is a                             






sufficient ​condition for our lives to have meaning. But while God’s existence is sufficient for life                               
to have meaning, is God the source of this meaning, even assuming that God exists? Do our                                 






Posit two possible worlds: ​G ​and ​NG​. Both worlds – ​G ​and ​NG ​– are perfect duplicates of each                                     
other, but with one exception: God exists in ​G ​but God doesn’t exist in ​NG​. Moreover, both                                 
worlds – apart from the existence or non­existence of God – are perfect duplicates of the actual                                 
world. To rephrase this: we either exist in ​G ​or ​NG​. If God exists, then we exist in ​G​, but if God                                           
does not exist, then we exist in ​NG​.   
Here, we are agnostic as to whether we are in ​G ​or ​NG​. ​So suppose, for the moment, that                                     
both worlds are at least ​epistemically possible​. That is, given the current state of knowledge, we                               
might, for all we know, exist in ​G​, or we might, for all we know, exist in ​NG​. Furthermore,                                     9
assume that God is somehow the source of the meaning of life; God is necessary for life to have                                     
meaning; but then if there is no God, life cannot have meaning. So, in ​G​, our lives have                                   
9 ​Someone might object that if God exists, God exists necessarily. So there cannot be a                              
possible world – like ​NG ​– in which God does not exist. But this objection conflates                               
metaphysical and epistemological possibility. God’s existence or non­existence might be                   
metaphysically necessary, but that is a separate issue from our knowledge of God’s existence,                           






meaning; if God exists, then since the existence of God is sufficient for life to have meaning, our                                   
lives are meaningful. But in ​NG​, our lives do not have meaning; we have assumed that God is                                   
the source of the meaning of life and there is no God in ​NG​, so in ​NG​, our lives are meaningless.                                         
Again, by hypothesis, the two worlds are duplicates aside from the existence or non­existence of                             
God. So, two lives, one in ​G ​and one in ​NG​, can be qualitatively identical, yet one has meaning                                     
and the other does not. So the meaning of life does not depend on or supervene on or is not                                       
grounded in or determined by the actual content of our lives. The meaning of life does not                                 
depend upon any experiences that we have, on the nature of or content of our thoughts or beliefs,  
on any of our actions or accomplishments, on how moral or immoral we are, or on any                                 
relationships we form. We can do nothing to imbue our lives with meaning: two people can be                                 
complete duplicates yet only one of these lives might have meaning. Indeed, the meaning of life                               
would not even depend upon any beliefs about or attitudes towards God: someone could have the                               
same beliefs and attitudes towards God in both worlds, yet this is not sufficient for life to have                                   
meaning, since one person’s life would have meaning and the other’s wouldn’t. Yet, it seems                             
implausible to completely divorce the meaning of life from anything concerning the content of                           
particular lives. So our assumption – that God is the source of the meaning of life – is                                   
problematic.   
Theists might object that ​G and ​NG are not in fact identical in every respect, so the above                                   
argument fails. Classical theists often posit an interventionist God who, e.g., created the                         
universe and who might be responsible for (some of) the revelations and miracles described in                             
the major monotheistic religions. Perhaps at least some of God's interventions are necessary to                           





there are individuals in whose lives God has never intervened. Thus, it is highly plausible that                               
there are at least ​some individuals in ​G and ​NG who are identical in all relevant respects. And if                                     
the presence of divine intervention in one's life were necessary for one's life to have meaning,                               
then there would be some individuals in both ​G and ​NG whose lives do not have meaning. But                                   
again, since God is sufficient for life to have meaning, ​every life must be meaningful in ​G​. ​That                                   
is, we have reached a contradiction; therefore, divine intervention in one's life cannot be                           
necessary for that life to have meaning. 
Theists might respond that ​G and ​NG differ in another way: there would be an afterlife in                                 
G​, but no afterlife in ​NG​. Without an afterlife, our lives would be short and finite; compared to                                   
eternity, our short lives would be diminished to complete insignificance. This response is                         
implausible for two reasons. First, nothing about the non­existence of God logically entails that                           
there is no afterlife. There is an epistemically possible world in which there is both an afterlife                                 
and in which God does not exist. Because human lives might be eternal in such a world, on the                                     
theist's reasoning, life would have meaning. Therefore, given the theist's premises, life can have                           
meaning without God. That is, God would not be necessary for life to have a meaning, which is                                   
the very claim we are trying to establish. Second, it is difficult to see why the duration of                                   
something should reduce whatever meaning it has. For example, a vacation might last only a                             
few days, but might still be just as meaningful to the vacationer as a long vacation. Some might                                   
have different intuitions than us about the value of a short­lived experience, but we see no reason                                 
to prefer their intuitions over ours. Indeed, it seems there are some events that mean ​more                               












For convenience, call this the “four­fold distinction.” The theist might claim that while (i) and                             
(ii) can exist in both ​G and ​NG​, (iii) and (iv) can exist only in ​G​. The theist might state that                                         
without (iii) and (iv), our lives will not have any ultimate or cosmic significance or purpose, so                                 
without God, there can ultimately be no meaning to our lives after all. Or the theist might object                                   
that the meaning of our lives can only originate in some source external to ourselves, a source                                 
that is perfect, and so this source must be God. For instance, maybe God created us for some                                   




Suppose that human life has meaning. If so, there are two possibilities. First, human lives have                               
intrinsic meaning. That is, a human life is meaningful in and of itself. A life’s meaning is ​not                                   
dependent upon anything external to itself. So, e.g., if there was a possible world that contained                               
nothing aside from a single human being, the human life would still have meaning. Second,                             
human lives have meaning, but this meaning is ​not intrinsic to that life. It depends, rather, on                                 





themselves for their lives to have meaning. So, e.g., if there was a possible world that contained                                 
nothing aside from a single human being, that human life would not have meaning. These are                               
indeed the only two options; given the assumption that life has meaning, then either that meaning                               
is intrinsic to lives or not (and so is extrinsic); indeed, this is an instance of excluded middle.   
So, suppose that human lives have meaning in and of themselves; the meaning of life                             
does not depend upon anything external to people. But then, life would have meaning even if                               
God did not exist; the meaning of life could not be dependent upon God; God would not be                                   
necessary for life to have meaning. However, now suppose that the meaning of life is                             10
dependent upon something external to us. Indeed, suppose that the meaning of life is dependent                             
upon some relation that we stand in with God. But note that God’s existence is sufficient for life                                   
to have meaning (see above). So, lives in a possible world in which God exists will have                                 
meaning no matter what. But then any life – regardless of the nature or content of that life – will                                       
have meaning. So, the meaning of life will not depend upon any of our beliefs, actions, and so                                   
on. And again, this is implausible, which suggests that the meaning of life is not dependent upon                                 
God. So, given that life has meaning, either this meaning is intrinsic to us or not; but either                                   
option suggests that God is not necessary for life to have meaning. Therefore, God is not                               
necessary for human life to have meaning.  
10  A theist might object that even if our lives have ​intrinsic meaning, this does not imply                               
that this meaning is independent of God. God creates us, so in a sense, this meaning that lives                                   
intrinsically have still depends upon God for its existence (in a causal sense). But we suggest                               
that if lives can have meaning intrinsically, then these lives could have been caused by                             






To elaborate, suppose that an external source – specifically, God – is necessary for life to                               
have meaning. And recall the four­fold distinction discussed above. Given the four­fold                       
distinction, there are four possibilities: (a) the purpose we devote ourselves to matches the                           
purpose for which God created us; (b) the purpose we devote ourselves to does not match the                                 
purpose for which God created us; (c) the significance we attribute to our lives matches the                               
significance God attributes to us; or (d) the significance we attribute to our lives does not match                                 
the significance God attributes to us. But as we now argue, each possibility is problematic. This                               
suggests that God is not necessary for life to have meaning. 
First, suppose that (a) the purpose we devote ourselves to matches the purpose for which                             
God created us. But it is not clear that simply following God’s purpose for us would be                                 
sufficient to imbue life with meaning. For example, even though a child might be created by her                                 
parents for some particular purpose, the child might have no obligation to fulfill this purpose. If                               
Sue learns her parents created her solely for the purpose of harvesting her organs for a sibling,                                 
Sue has no obligation to fulfill this purpose. There are many differences between God and                             
human parents, and perhaps there is some relevant difference in virtue of which God's purposes                             
for us should be our purposes for ourselves, but it is difficult to see what that relevant difference                                   
could be.   
Moreover, God's role as creator does not, by itself, guarantee that the purpose we find                             
most satisfying is the purpose for which God created us. Perhaps it would be much more                               
satisfying if we chose our purpose for ourselves than if our purpose was preselected for us? If                                 
so, given a choice between a world in which God preselected a purpose for us and one in which                                     





know which purpose we would find most satisfying to devote our lives to; thus, given God's                               
benevolence, it seems plausible that God would create us so that, constitutionally, we would                           
have a desire to pursue the ends for which God created us and that those ends brought about                                   
some good for us. Nonetheless, in ​NG​, our lives would be devoted towards identical ends. Thus,                               
whatever goods God accomplished in virtue of creating us in ​G would also be actualized in ​NG​,                                 
or in the absence of God; but then God would not be necessary for life to have meaning. And it                                       
is difficult to understand why God's experiencing those goods would be necessary for our lives to                               
have meaning, unless God created us as means for God’s ends, irrespective of what our desires                               
are. Yet it is unlikely that God, a perfectly good being, would create us for God’s ends,                                 
irrespective of our desires, because this would involve treating creatures as mere means instead                           
of as ends unto themselves. It is even more difficult to see how this would be required for our                                     
lives to have purpose.  In short, (a) is problematic.   
Now consider (b): God's purposes do not match our purposes. So, God has created us for                               
some end or ends, yet we are constituted to desire some other ends. This is incoherent. ​Ceteris                                 
paribus​, given the choice of creating ​x​, which accomplishes some collection of ends ​C​, and ​y​,                               
which does not accomplish ​C as well as ​x accomplishes ​C​, a rational agent who wishes to                                 
accomplish ​C would always prefer creating ​x over ​y​. The more intelligent and knowledgeable                           
the agent, the more the agent would be aware of how successful any possible creation would be                                 
at accomplishing ​C​; and the more powerful the agent, the more the agent would be capable of                                 
creating what they prefer. Thus, God, as a perfectly rational and capable being, would create                             





constructed that found pursuing ends other than God's to be maximally satisfying, there would be                             
a contradiction between God's nature and God's creation. 
The preceding argument – that it is incoherent for God to create creatures whose purpose                             
does not match God's – is an instance of a dysteleological argument. Dysteleological arguments                           
hold that, while natural theologians have posited a meeting of ends and purposes in their                             
observations of nature indicative of design, many natural structures are not well designed and fail                             
to be optimally suited for their functions. For example, Gould (1978) argues that the panda's                             
thumb is not well designed for the function the thumb performs for the panda. One objection to                                 
dysteleological arguments is that they require us to know what God's intentions were. If God                             
intended to create a sub­optimal thumb for the panda, then the fact that the thumb possesses a                                 
sub­optimal thumb is not evidence contrary to design after all (Sober 2008: 127­128). Moreover,                           
it seems plausible that design can be detected even when we do not know what the intentions of                                   
the designer were. For example, archaeologists can infer that artifacts were produced by agents                           
even if we do not know the agent’s intentions. For instance, artifacts might have been produced                               
for religious rituals about which we know nothing. But this response to ​other ​dysteleological                           
arguments cannot succeed as a response to ​our dysteleological argument. For while we do not                             
know what purpose, if any, God might have had for the panda's thumb, we have postulated – ​by                                   
hypothesis – a case in which humans fail to accomplish the ends for which God created them.                                 
Cases in which we are so constituted that our purposes fail to match God's are incoherent and                                 
therefore need no further consideration. 
Now consider (c): the importance God attributes to us matches the importance we                         





regardless of whether we lived in ​G or ​NG​. Therefore, it is difficult to see what difference God                                   
would make in this scenario. 
Finally, consider (d): the importance God attributes to us does not match the importance                           
we attribute to ourselves. If so, there are two possibilities: either we attribute a greater                             
importance to ourselves than God or we attribute less importance to ourselves than God.                           
Assuming that we attribute ​more importance to ourselves than God, our lives would be imbued                             
with a deep sense of importance (even if inappropriate) in both ​G and ​NG​. So, it is difficult to                                     
see why we would need to be in ​G ​as opposed to ​NG ​for our lives to have meaning.                                     
Furthermore, there are individuals, such as the severely depressed, who attribute very little, if                           
any, importance to their life; surely, the theist would want to say that God values such people                                 
more than they value themselves. But if so, then not all humans value their lives more than God                                   
values their lives. 
But assuming that we attribute ​less importance to ourselves than God, we arrive at a                             
variant of the problem of evil. For God to create beings that tend to regard their lives as less                                     
meaningful than they are would involve God creating beings who suffer more than they need to                               
(i.e., if they had known the actual meaningfulness of their lives, they would suffer less). This                               
would be gratuitous suffering; and again, God’s existence is not consistent with gratuitous                         
suffering. And as with the dysteleological argument, common objections to the problem of evil                           
– such as Skeptical theism – constitute inappropriate responses. Therefore, it is difficult to make                             






In sum, if we assume that God is necessary for life to have meaning, there are four                                 




We now offer a third argument for doubting that God is a necessary condition for meaningful                               
human life.   
Suppose that God is necessary for our lives to have meaning. But then, the meaning of                               
life must arise through some sort of relation, whatever it might be, that we stand in with respect                                   
to God; for if no such relation between us and God is needed for life to have meaning, then our                                       
lives could have meaning independently of God. For example, this relation that we stand in with                               
God could be some or all of the following: our lives obtain meaning through belief in God, or                                   
through following God’s plan for us, or by following the commandments of God, or through                             
actions related to God, or through some other means. The important point is that, given our                               
assumptions, our lives become meaningful through a relation – whatever it might be – between                             
us and God. The question is: for life to have meaning, do we also (i) need to be ​conscious​ of this                                     
relationship with God or (ii) not? Do we have to be aware of this relationship and, say, perform                                   
actions in accordance with it, for example, for our lives to have meaning? 
Suppose (i); we do have to be aware of this relation that we stand in with God for life to                                       
have meaning. Perhaps we have to act certain ways given this relation for life to have meaning                                 
(e.g., we have to worship God, or go to church, we have to at least know that God exists, or                                       





assuming that God exists, it seems that not everyone can be aware of their relation with God, and                                   
indeed, for some, this lack of knowledge is not their fault; that is, there appear to be cases of                                     
“blameless non­belief.” For example, some, simply because of where or when they were born,                           
have little or even no chance to become aware of their relationship with God. As Maitzen (2006)                                 
convincingly argues, it is difficult to understand the geographic distribution of theism if an                           
all­powerful God exists and desires a relationship with all humans; the problem is that some are                               
born in areas (e.g., predominately atheistic societies) where it is unlikely they will become                           
theists. And what of those who were born ​before monotheism became widespread? In short,                           
because of personal circumstances that were beyond their control, some will not become aware                           
of their relationship with God, even assuming that this relationship exists. Furthermore, even                         
among those who live in highly religious cultures, some individuals are less cognitively disposed                           
towards theism than others. Recent studies in cognitive science demonstrate that belief in God                           
(or, more generally, in supernatural entities) correlates with theory of mind. A larger percentage                           
of those who possess a diminished theory of mind (hypoactive agent detection) – such as autistic                               
individuals – are non­theist (Caldwell­Harris, Catherine, et al., 2009; Gervais 2013 – especially,                         
p 18), while those with an exaggerated theory of mind (hyperactive agent detection) – such as                               
schizophrenic individuals (Gervais 2013, pp 18­19; Crespi & Babcock, 2008) – tend to                         
overdetect agency and teleology in the world, and tend to believe in God with above average                               
frequency. It is difficult to understand how a loving and all­powerful God, who presumably                           
desired relationships with all humans, would design humans with differing cognitive capacities                       
for forming relationships with God. In short, if the meaning of life depends upon an awareness                               





minimum, God treats people differently based on things that were outside of their control, a deep                               
injustice. God cannot be unjust, so God probably doesn’t exist given (i). Moreover, if awareness                             
of our relationship with God is necessary for life to have meaning, and many – through no fault                                   
of their own – will not be aware of this relationship, then these people’s lives will lack meaning.                                   
But if their lives lack meaning, then their suffering is gratuitous. And the existence of gratuitous                               
suffering is inconsistent with the existence of God, so again, given (i), God cannot exist. Even                               
the theist should reject (i).   
The alternative is that (ii) we do not need to be aware of our relationship to God for life                                     
to have meaning. So now, those who – through no fault of their own – are not aware of this                                       
relation can have meaningful lives. They stand in the necessary relation to God for life to have                                 
meaning; they are simply unaware of it. But now, it is difficult to see why anyone should bother                                   
being religious. If the meaning of life is not enhanced in any way from, say, even being aware of                                     
the existence of God, let alone from acting on the knowledge of our relationship with God, then                                 
religion adds no meaning to our life. So the idea that God is the source of the meaning of life is                                         




Consider Divine Command Theory (DCT): moral facts are (somehow) reducible to God's                       
commands. And consider a problem with DCT, the Euthyphro Dilemma: is ​x moral because                           
God commands ​x or does God command ​x because it is moral? If the former, then the fact that ​x                                       





those facts would have been the actual reason that ​x was moral and not God's command. Yet if                                   
morality were arbitrary, God could command us to commit heinous acts and it would be morally                               
obligatory for us to commit them, which seems wrong. But if the latter, then ​x is moral                                 
independently of God's commands and DCT is false. 
A parallel argument can be constructed for the meaning of life. One can ask, “do our                               
lives have meaning because God decrees that they do, or do our lives have meaning                             
independently of God?” If our lives have meaning independently of God, then they do not have                               
meaning simply because God decrees that they do; God would not be necessary for life to have                                 
meaning. But our lives probably do have meaning independently of God, for if our lives have                               
meaning only because God says so, a number of difficulties (that parallel those faced by DCT)                               
arise: God could arbitrarily decide to change what things have meaning and what things do not;                               
meaning will (arguably) not be objective; it is puzzling how something can have meaning simply                             
because an authority says it does; God cannot be praised for being significant “meaningful” and                             
so on. Of course, this argument cannot show – and does not try to show – that God does not                                       
exist; it simply argues that ​if there is a God, God is not what gives our lives meaning (if our lives                                         
are in fact meaningful). So, ​if our current lives have meaning, then they have meaning whether                               
God exists or not, and so should also have meaning if atheism or naturalism is true. That is, God                                     
is not a ​necessary​ condition for our lives to have meaning.  
However, to defend DCT, some theists have responded that the Euthyphro Dilemma is a                           
false dichotomy. It might be that these theistic defenses of DCT succeed, but even assuming that                               
they do, this does not imply that they can simply be adapted to defend the claim that God is                                     





facts require a perfect standard of goodness. ​Just as the length of the meter is determined by the                                   
length of a standard piece of metal, so too goodness is grounded in a perfect person who                                 
maximally exemplifies goodness (see, for example, Craig (1997); Alston (2002)). ​Likewise,                    
perhaps for our lives to have meaning, meaningfulness must be grounded in the standard of some                               
being whose life is perfectly meaningful. Only God could have a perfectly meaningful life, so                             
only God could ground life's meaningfulness. This possibility might avoid Euthyphro Dilemma                       
style objections; e.g., on this view, God could not arbitrarily decide to make things meaningful.                             
Instead, meaning is grounded in God's nature as the standard of meaningfulness. But is this view                               
plausible? God's life would be perfectly meaningful without any external source of its                         
meaningfulness. But then it is difficult to see why ​we would need an external source of meaning                                 
if God does not require one. In other words, if a perfectly meaningful life does not require some                                   
external measure, then why do less perfect lives require an external measure?   
But there are other ways defenders of DCT have tried to ground morality in God. One                               
view claims that properties in general are (somehow) grounded in God; so moral properties, qua                             
properties, are grounded in God. Meaningfulness might be a property; so perhaps this view can                             
ground meaningfulness in God and overcome our fourth argument? One suggestion to ground                         
properties (and so moral properties) in God identifies properties with God's essence (see, for                           
example, Leftow (1990)). According to classical theism, God cannot depend upon anything else                         
(i.e., aseity); thus, God cannot depend upon God’s properties in the way that creatures do.                             
Indeed, God is the unique necessarily existent being that depends upon nothing else. Yet, God                             
cannot be said to create God’s properties because God cannot be explanatorily or causally prior                             





simplicity. It is difficult to make sense of God’s properties on divine simplicity, but suppose the                               
theist can make sense of this. But note that, by ‘property’, we do not mean instances of                                 
properties, but what platonists might have called the Forms. If God’s properties were merely                           
instances of some collection of universals (or abstracts), then God would depend upon those                           
universals (or abstracts). Again, moral properties are properties. Thus, on this view, moral                         
properties would be identical to God’s essence. If so, then it is not God’s commandments that                               
make it wrong to murder (for example) but God's essential goodness. The commands God issues                             
might still create moral obligation, but they cannot be inconsistent with God’s nature and so are                               
not arbitrary. On this view, which would arguably overcome at least some of the traditional                             
objections to DCT, God’s essence is identical to properties; so perhaps the meaningfulness of life                             
is a property of life; and thus, meaningfulness would be identical to God’s essence. So, it would                                 
not be arbitrary that life is meaningful because meaningfulness would be grounded in the                           
objective, eternal, and necessary essence of God. However, given that meaningfulness would be                         
identical to God's essence and that God's essence does not require a creator, the theist would be                                 
committed to the view that meaningfulness does not require a creator. But then meaningfulness                           
might as well exist, uncreated, without God as a platonic form. In which case God is not                                 
necessary to ground meaning.   
Other attempts to ground properties in God claim that properties are ideas in God's mind.                             
Given that God (and therefore God's ideas) is external to space and time, eternal, and necessary,                               
these views can explain why properties are external to space and time, eternal, and necessary.                             
But can views of this sort ground meaningfulness as an idea in God's mind in such a way that                                     





an idea of meaningfulness arbitrarily or for some reason ​R​. But if God conceives of the idea                                 
because of ​R​, then ​R​, and not God, is why God conceived of it; ​R ​makes the idea meaningful and                                       
this is why God conceives of it; so it is meaningful independently of God, or else arbitrarily                                 
meaningful. Moreover, it is difficult to understand the order of explanation in a view that posits                               
meaningfulness as an idea in God's mind. On the one hand, the notion that God's life produces                                 
meaning seems comprehensible. But on the other hand, in order to explain ​God's life as                             
meaningful, meaningfulness would have to be explanatorily independent to God's life. Yet, on a                           
view in which meaningfulness is an idea in God's mind, meaningfulness would be explanatorily                           
dependent on God's life. Thus, such views would incorrectly reverse the order of explanation;                           




We argued that God is sufficient, though not necessary, for human life to have meaning. These                               
claims, taken in isolation, are consistent with both theism and atheism. So taken in isolation,                             
they cannot count as an argument for or against theism or atheism. However, these claims are                               
not wholly unrelated to questions concerning God’s existence. For example, one can combine                         
claim (1) with an additional claim to form a novel argument for atheism. The “argument from                               
meaninglessness” is: 
(1)  If​ God exists, then all lives have meaning.  (Premise, defended above)   







That is, if it could be shown that even just one life lacks (or lacked) meaning throughout human                                   
history, then God does not exist. Note that this argument is not logically equivalent to the                               
problem of evil. For example, it seems possible that one could suffer greatly yet have a                               
meaningful life; or one could not suffer yet have a meaningless life. Moreover, arguably, given                             
theism it is not merely that all lives must have meaning; but this meaning must be an                                 
“appropriate” one, one worthy of the creation of a perfect being. It does not seem implausible                               
that some people, e.g., John Wayne Gacy, have lived lives that lack such an “appropriate”                             
meaning.   
Furthermore, some claim that our lives could have meaning only if God exists. Indeed,                           
sometimes theists make this claim, and then argue that since life has meaning, God exists. But                               
such arguments backfire and actually entail the falsity of theism. For if God could be the only                                 
thing that could give our lives meaning, but God could not be the source of the meaning of life,                                     
as we argued above, then our lives do not have meaning. And since God could not create                                 
meaningless human life, God cannot exist. In sum, while our arguments are not directly related                             
to questions concerning the existence of God, they have some bearing on them insofar as (i) they                                 
suggest the possibility of a novel argument against theism and (ii) suggest that one extant                             
argument for theism cannot succeed.   
Logically speaking, there are only so many positions one can take on the relationship                           
between God and the meaning of life. One might claim that (a) God exists or (b) God does not                                     
exist. And given (a) or (b), one might claim that (c) life has meaning or (d) life is meaningless.                                     





and (d). But if the arguments above are correct, position (2) can be eliminated: if God is                                 
sufficient for the meaning of life, then God’s existence is inconsistent with meaningless human                           
life. Moreover, since God is not necessary for meaningful human life, (3) remains a live option.                               
Of course, since God’s existence entails that our lives are meaningful, the theist must endorse                             
(1). So, perhaps given theism, something like the following picture is true: God surveyed the                             
logically possible worlds, trying to decide which world to actualize. Some worlds contain life;                           
and in some of these worlds, life has meaning, while perhaps in others, it does not. So, e.g., in                                     
one world, a man is ceaselessly pushing a boulder up a hill only to have it roll back down the hill                                         
again; this life might have meaning and might not. But the meaning (or lack thereof) of these                                 
lives is there independently of God. God is not necessary for the meaning of life. But God is                                   
good and so on, so God will choose to actualize a world in which life has meaning. We are not                                       
saying this picture is true; we are simply trying to determine what the theist might claim given                                 
the conditionals above. At any rate, on this picture, God’s existence is sufficient for life to have                                 
a meaning. Moreover, given atheism, position (3) or (4) is true. It might be that the actual world                                   
simply exists for no reason, or perhaps there is a reason for the existence of the actual world that                                     
does not involve God (e.g., the world exists because of various laws of physics). But whatever                               
the reason, it might just so happen that we exist in a world in which our lives have meaning.                                     
Again, God’s existence is not necessary for life to have a meaning, so atheism does not                               
necessarily preclude us from having meaningful lives.    11
 
11  We would like to thank an anonymous referee for immensely helpful comments on an 
earlier draft.   
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